

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 GENEVA 04537

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF MARCH 23, 1978
(SALT TWO-1667)

- SEMENOV STATEMENT, MARCH 23, 1978

- I

I WILL EXPRESS CERTAIN CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE
PRESENT GENERAL STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE
DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA.

AS YOU KNOW, AS A RESULT OF JOINT EFFORTS BY THE END
OF LAST YEAR THE POSITIONS OF THE USSR AND THE U.S. ON
QUESTIONS OF THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
CONVERGED TO A CERTAIN EXTENT. THIS IS ALSO REFLECTED IN
THE EXISTING JOINT DRAFT TEXTS OF THE DOCUMENTS BEING
WORKED OUT. HOWEVER, RECENTLY THE PROCESS OF GIVING
EFFECT TO EXISTING UNDERSTANDINGS CONCERNING CONCLUSION OF
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THE NEW TREATY ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY
AND EQUAL SECURITY OF THE SIDES HAS COME TO A STANDSTILL AS
A RESULT OF THE UNCONSTRUCTIVE AND EVASIVE POSITION OF THE
U.S. SIDE.

YOU KNOW THAT IN THIS CONNECTION THE QUESTION ARISES:
IS THIS SITUATION NOT REMINISCENT OF WHAT HAPPENED AFTER

THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VLADIVOSTOK WHEN, AS YOU KNOW, A GREAT DEAL OF EFFORT WAS REQUIRED TO PUT THE MATTER OF WORKING OUT AN AGREEMENT BACK ON TRACK? PERSONALLY, I FIND THIS QUESTION DIFFICULT TO ANSWER.

I CAN SAY THAT ALTHOUGH WE ARE WORKING ON PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF EMBODYING THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDINGS IN THE PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFTS BEING NEGOTIATED, HERE, TOO, WE SOMETIMES HEAR GRANDILOQUENT AND CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS. AND RECENTLY EVEN THE DRAFTING GROUP HAS BEEN MARCHING IN PLACE. THIS IS AN OBVIOUS WASTE OF TIME.

THE ISSUES REMAINING ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE ARE LESS COMPLICATED THAN THOSE WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN RESOLVED IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. AND SUCH QUESTIONS ARE FAR FEWER IN NUMBER. BUT, IT ALSO CANNOT BE DENIED THAT MERE STATEMENTS REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF COMPLETING THE AGREEMENT IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE CANNOT BE RECOGNIZED AS SUFFICIENT FOR RESOLVING THE TASKS BEFORE THE DELEGATIONS.

IT IS ALSO NECESSARY FOR THIS TO BE REINFORCED BY SPECIFIC PRACTICAL STEPS AIMED AT REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE REMAINING BRACKETED PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT BY STEPS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY, EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

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IF THIS INCONSISTENT AND, TO BE BLUNT, VAGUE POLICY CONCEALS A DESIRE TO GET UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE INTERESTS OF THE USSR, OR IF THIS IS ACCOMPANIED BY A PRETENSE OF FAVORING AGREEMENT, WHILE STRIVING FOR SOMETHING ELSE, THEN SUCH A POSITION WILL NOT BE TENABLE FOR LONG--TRUTH WILL OUT. DOES SUCH A POSITION MEET THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF EITHER SIDE, OR, IN BROADER TERMS, THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY? I WOULD THINK THERE IS NO NEED TO PROVE HERE THAT, NO, IT DOES NOT.

THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IS TO CORRECT THE SITUATION BY ACTING WHILE THERE IS STILL TIME. AND HERE IT IS NOT UP TO THE SOVIET SIDE.

HERE, TOO, THE SOVIET SIDE HAS ALWAYS PATIENTLY WORKED TO ELIMINATE ALL EXTRANEIOUS MATTERS FROM THE PROBLEMS OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. WE HAVE ENOUGH PATIENCE FOR THIS, BUT THAT PATIENCE IS NOT LIMITLESS. IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT THE OTHER SIDE, TOO,

SERIOUSLY WEIGH THE QUESTIONS ARISING IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THAT IT GENUINELY PERCEIVE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PRESENT MOMENT.

WE HAVE ALREADY STATED HERE MORE THAN ONCE THAT BOTH SIDES ARE EQUALLY INTERESTED IN A SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS AND IN THE CONCLUSION OF THE NEW TREATY. IT IS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT PROGRESS AT THE

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EXDIS, USSALTTWO

NEGOTIATIONS CANNOT BE ENSURED BY THE EFFORTS OF ONE SIDE ONLY. RECIPROCITY IS REQUIRED.

AS YOU KNOW, PRIOR TO THE WORKING RECESS AS WELL AS AFTER IT, THE SOVIET SIDE TABLED A WHOLE SERIES OF PROPOSALS WHICH OPEN THE WAY TO A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTIONS REMAINING BEFORE THE DELEGATIONS.

HERE ARE THE FACTS.

AT THE MEETINGS OF JANUARY 12, FEBRUARY 8 AND 16 AND MARCH 2, 1978, THE USSR DELEGATION SET FORTH THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET SIDE ON ARTICLE II, PAR. 3, AND ALSO ON ARTICLE VIII OF THE DRAFT TREATY. AS A WHOLE, BY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS HELD BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS, THE SOVIET PROPOSALS ON THIS SCORE PROVIDE A BASIS FOR AN AGREED SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM UNDER CONSIDERATION IN ITS ENTIRETY. WE HAVE HEARD STATEMENTS HERE ABOUT THE CONSTRUCTIVE NATURE OF THE STEPS TAKEN, AND THAT THE

QUESTION IS UNDER STUDY. BUT SO FAR THERE HAS BEEN NO
REAL PROGRESS.

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AT THE FEBRUARY 23, 1978 MEETING A NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL
WAS TABLED CONCERNING A BAN ON FLIGHT-TESTS AND DEPLOYMENT
OF NEW TYPES OF ICBMS UNDER ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL.
AT THE MARCH 16, 1978 MEETING ARGUMENTS AND ADDITIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS WERE PRESENTED IN SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET
SIDE'S APPROACH. IT MUST BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THE SOVIET
PROPOSALS TABLED PROVIDE FOR EFFECTIVE AND MEANINGFUL
OBLIGATIONS OF THE SIDES ON BANNING NEW TYPES OF MISSILES
IN STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY, EQUAL
SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE,
ENSURING THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS OF THE SIDES.

AT THE JANUARY 24, 1978 MEETING, IN THE INTEREST OF
MAKING PROGRESS IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS OF
THE DRAFT THE USSR DELEGATION PRESENTED NEW REVISED WORDING
FOR ARTICLE XII OF THE TREATY--ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND
NON-TRANSFER. YOU WILL REALIZE THAT THE PROVISION ON
NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND NON-TRANSFER, BEING A MOST IMPORTANT
GUARANTEE OF THE EFFECTIVENESS AND VIABILITY OF THE
LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED, IS A CONDITION SINE QUA NON
OF THE TREATY. OUR NEW PROPOSALS IN THIS CONNECTION,
RESULTING FROM THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS HELD AT THE NEGOTIA-
TIONS, MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO REACH A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY
SOLUTION. BUT APPROPRIATE DISCUSSIONS HAVE NOT YET TAKEN
PLACE.

AT THE JANUARY 27, 1978 MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION,
PROVIDING APPROPRIATE DETAILED RATIONALE, SET FORTH AD-
DITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE SOVIET SIDE ON THE QUESTION
OF LOWERING THE AGGREGATE NUMERICAL LEVEL OF THE STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS BEING LIMITED, AND ALSO ON ESTABLISHING AN
OVERALL LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND
SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS. THE SCOPE AND TIMING PROPOSED
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BY THE SOVIET SIDE FOR LOWERING THE AGGREGATE NUMERICAL
LEVEL OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ALREADY DURING THE TERM
OF THE TREATY BEING WORKED OUT HAVE BEEN DETERMINED WITH
DUE ACCOUNT FOR ENSURING STRATEGIC STABILITY, ARE BASED ON
THE ACTUAL POSSIBILITY OF CARRYING OUT THE OBLIGATIONS
BEING ASSUMED AND PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY MISUNDER-

STANDING OR AMBIGUITY IN THE COURSE OF THEIR IMPLEMENTATION. THE SOVIET SIDE'S APPROACH TO THESE ISSUES ENSURES GENUINE EQUALITY OF THE INTERESTS OF THE SIDES IN THE AREA UNDER CONSIDERATION. THIS IS ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

IN THE COURSE OF THE WORK EVEN PRIOR TO THE WORKING RECESS THE USSR DELEGATION AT THE OCTOBER 19 AND DECEMBER 6, 1977 MEETINGS, IN PARTICULAR, SET FORTH THE SOVIET SIDE'S APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF NOTIFICATIONS OF PLANNED ICBM LAUNCHES--UNDER ARTICLE XVI OF THE DRAFT TREATY. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RECENT AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING TO THIS ARTICLE, THE SOVIET PROPOSALS TABLED MAKE POSSIBLE CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRESS ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS IN THIS QUESTION AS WELL.

SUCH, IN OUR VIEW, IS THE OBJECTIVE STATE OF AFFAIRS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS BEING CONDUCTED HERE.

WE FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT CONCRETE PROGRESS ON THE ISSUES I CITED AND ON OTHER RELEVANT ISSUES, INCLUDING THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND BASIC GUIDELINES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS, WOULD MEET THE OBJECTIVES OF THE WORK ON REACHING AGREEMENT ON MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PROVISIONS FOR THE DRAFTS OF THE DOCUMENTS BEING WORKED OUT.

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AMONG THE MAIN QUESTIONS STILL REMAINING IS THAT OF

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S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 05 GENEVA 04537

EXDIS, USSALTTWO

LIMITATIONS ON CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE IN EXCESS OF

600 KILOMETERS, WHICH HAS BEEN DISCUSSED MORE THAN ONCE
IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS HERE.

BOTH SIDES HAVE REAFFIRMED THE AGREED PROVISIONS OF
THE DOCUMENTS BEING WORKED OUT, WHICH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH
EXISTING UNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S.,
ESTABLISH SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING ANY CRUISE
MISSILE OF THAT RANGE.

AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON THE PROVISIONS OF
ARTICLE III, PARS. 1 AND 2, OF THE PROTOCOL--ON THE
OBLIGATION OF THE SIDES NOT TO FLIGHT TEST CRUISE MIS-
SILES WITH A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 2,500 KILOMETERS, OR TO
DEPLOY SUCH MISSILES, AND ON THE OBLIGATION NOT TO DEPLOY
CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS
ON SEA-BASED OR LAND-BASED LAUNCHERS. THIS IS AN ESSENTIAL
PART OF THE SYSTEM OF LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED.

I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT ON THE QUESTION OF
CRUISE MISSILES, AS WELL AS ON OTHER QUESTIONS OF THE
JOINT DRAFTS BEING WORKED OUT, THE SOVIET SIDE HAS DIS-
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PLAYED GREAT FLEXIBILITY IN SEEKING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
SOLUTION. INDEED, CONTINGENT UPON INCLUSION OF HEAVY
BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE IN
EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS WITHIN CERTAIN CEILINGS FOR
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, IT IS PERMITTED TO HAVE LONG-
RANGE CRUISE MISSILES AS AGREED AT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN
WASHINGTON.

THIS STEP WAS TAKEN BY THE SOVIET SIDE IN ORDER TO
FACILITATE AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH, AS YOU KNOW, WE BELIEVE
IT WOULD BE BEST IF LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES WERE NOT
PRODUCED OR DEPLOYED AT ALL.

AS FOR THE WILLINGNESS OF THE SOVIET SIDE TO INCLUDE
AMONG MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS ALL MISSILES OF THOSE
TYPE WHICH HAVE BEEN TESTED WITH SUCH REENTRY VEHICLES,
IT REMAINS CONTINGENT UPON REACHING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
SOLUTIONS FOR CRUISE MISSILES AND OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES.

ON THE QUESTION OF LIMITATIONS ON BOMBERS EQUIPPED
FOR LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES, THE USSR DELEGATION,
PRESENTING RELEVANT REASONS, HAS SET FORTH THE APPROACH
IN PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVIET SIDE, AT THE MARCH 2, 1978
MEETING IN PARTICULAR.

THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT IT IS
PRECISELY BOMBERS THAT COULD BE EQUIPPED WITH LONG-RANGE

CRUISE MISSILES, I.E., THOSE TYPES OF AIRPLANES WHICH ARE SPECIALLY BUILT TO BE EQUIPPED WITH BOMBS OR MISSILES, AND THAT THE SIDES WOULD ASSUME THE OBLIGATION NOT TO FLIGHT TEST CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS FROM AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN THE BOMBERS WHICH ARE COUNTED AS HEAVY BOMBERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE II,
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PAR. 3, AND NOT TO DEPLOY SUCH AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED FOR THESE MISSILES.

IN THIS CONNECTION IT IS ENVISAGED THAT THE SIDES WILL NOT FLIGHT TEST CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS FROM TRANSPORT AIRPLANES, WILL NOT DEPLOY TRANSPORT AIRPLANES EQUIPPED FOR SUCH MISSILES, AND WILL NOT CONVERT TRANSPORT AIRPLANES FOR THESE PURPOSES.

PRECISELY SUCH A SOLUTION TO THIS QUESTION WOULD BE FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE ESSENCE OF THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED AS A RESULT OF THE SOVIET-U.S. NEGOTIATIONS IN WASHINGTON AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER 1977.

IT HAS ALREADY BEEN STATED HERE, AND I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THIS AGAIN, THAT ATTEMPTS TO RESERVE THE POSSIBILITY OF EQUIPPING NOT ONLY BOMBERS, BUT ACTUALLY ANY TYPE OF AIRPLANE, INCLUDING TRANSPORT AIRPLANES, WITH LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES, WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO STRIVING FOR A SHARP BUILDUP OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN AN ADDITIONAL, FORMERLY NON-EXISTENT AREA.

SUCH AN ABOUT-FACE WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE OBJECTIVES OF THE DOCUMENT BEING WORKED OUT AND THE TASK OF CURBING THE RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

AT THE JANUARY 31, 1978 MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION AGAIN SET FORTH ITS CONSIDERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPOSED DIVISION OF CRUISE MISSILES INTO MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR AND WITH CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS. I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE CATEGORICALLY REJECTS

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S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 05 GENEVA 04537

EXDIS, USSALTTWO

THE PROVISION ENVISAGING DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE
LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR-ARMED AND CONVENTIONALLY-ARMED
CRUISE MISSILES, AS INCONSISTENT WITH THE EXISTING UNDER-
STANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES AND AS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE.
THIS IS REFLECTED IN THE SOVIET FOOTNOTE ON PAGE 49 OF THE
JOINT DRAFT TEXT.

IN THE COURSE OF THE ONGOING DISCUSSIONS, INCLUDING
THOSE IN THE DRAFTING GROUP, THE USSR DELEGATION HAS SET
FORTH DETAILED CLARIFICATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS IN SUPPORT
OF THE SOVIET SIDE'S PROPOSAL FOR THE DEFINITION OF CRUISE
MISSILES AND THEIR RANGE.

THE DEFINITION OF CRUISE MISSILE RANGE MUST BE WHOLLY
CONSISTENT WITH THE CONTENT OF THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN THE SIDES ON THE LIMITATION OF THESE MISSILES,
WHICH PROVIDES FOR ESTABLISHING LIMITS OF 600 AND 2,500
KILOMETERS. IT IS PRECISELY THESE TOTALLY UNAMBIGUOUS
LIMITS THAT MUST BE EMBODIED IN THE DEFINITION OF CRUISE
MISSILE RANGE WHICH IS BEING WORKED OUT.

THE SOVIET SIDE'S PROPOSAL ON THE DRAFT OF THE AGREED
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STATEMENT TO ARTICLE II, PAR. 6, OF THE TREATY PROVIDES
THAT THE RANGE OF A CRUISE MISSILE IS THE MAXIMUM DISTANCE
WHICH CAN BE COVERED BY THE MISSILE IN ITS STANDARD DESIGN
MODE, DETERMINED BY PROJECTING ITS FLIGHT TRAJECTORY
ONTO THE EARTH'S SURFACE.

BEING FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING
IN THIS AREA, SUCH AN APPROACH MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO
ESTABLISH A SINGLE UNDERSTANDING OF THE MAXIMUM DISTANCE

A CRUISE MISSILE CAN COVER.

AND, CONVERSELY, TO BRING INTO THE DEFINITION BEING WORKED OUT SUCH CRITERIA AS, FOR EXAMPLE, SO-CALLED "OPERATIONAL RANGE," "EFFECTIVE ENGAGEMENT OF THE TARGET" AND "FULL SYSTEM UTILIZATION" WOULD MEAN THAT THE CONCEPT OF THE RANGE OF THESE MISSILES WOULD LOSE THE REQUIRED PRECISION AND SINGULARITY OF MEANING, AND IN A PRACTICAL SENSE WOULD LEAD TO THE POSSIBILITY OF EXCEEDING THE ESTABLISHED LIMITS ON CRUISE MISSILE RANGE--600 AND 2,500 KILOMETERS.

IF ONE WERE TO TAKE THAT PATH, THEN, FOR EXAMPLE, CRUISE MISSILES HAVING IDENTICAL CHARACTERISTICS COULD BE CONSIDERED AS HAVING DIFFERENT RANGES, DEPENDING ON THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THEY ARE USED, WHILE CRUISE MISSILES HAVING COMPLETELY DIFFERENT RANGES COULD BE CLASSIFIED AS HAVING THE SAME RANGE MERELY BY VIRTUE OF BEING ASSIGNED SIMILAR OPERATIONAL MISSIONS.

THIS IS CONTRARY TO THE COMMON APPROACH WHICH PROVIDES FOR WORKING OUT LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, BUT BY NO MEANS LIMITATIONS ON THE CONDITIONS OF THEIR USE. NO SUCH TASK HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO THE DELEGATIONS.

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I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FOLLOWING.

AT THE OCTOBER 19, 1977 MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION STATED THAT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PROPOSAL WE TABLED AT THAT TIME FOR ARTICLE III OF THE PROTOCOL, THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSES DELETION OF CURRENT SUBPARAGRAPH (D) OF ARTICLE IX OF THE DRAFT TREATY, WHICH CONCERNS CRUISE MISSILES OF INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE.

INDEED, SINCE THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE III OF THE PROTOCOL, WHICH ESTABLISH AN UPPER LIMIT OF 2,500 KILOMETERS FOR CRUISE MISSILE RANGE ARE AGREED, SUBPARAGRAPH (D) OF ARTICLE IX BECOMES SUPERFLUOUS. AFTER ALL, IF IT WERE RETAINED, THEN IN A CERTAIN SENSE THIS WOULD AFFECT THE NATURE OF THE DECISIONS WHICH COULD BE TAKEN BY THE SIDES WITH RESPECT TO LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES IN THE COURSE OF FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THERE IS MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES TO THE EFFECT THAT THE TREATY BEING WORKED OUT MUST NOT PREDETERMINE THE SPECIFIC CONTENT OF SUBSEQUENT UNDERSTANDINGS ON QUESTIONS INCLUDED IN THE PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY.

I MUST REAFFIRM THE SOVIET SIDE'S PROPOSAL THAT,
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS OF
ARTICLE III OF THE PROTOCOL, THE PROVISION IN SUBPARA-
GRAPH (D) OF ARTICLE IX OF THE DRAFT TREATY MUST BE
REMOVED.

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S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 05 GENEVA 04537

EXDIS, USSALTTWO

THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO WORK IN A CONSTRUCTIVE AND
BUSINESSLIKE MANNER ON COMPLETING THE AGREEMENT ON THE
REMAINING PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFTS, INCLUDING THOSE
CONCERNING LIMITATIONS ON LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES,
BEING ESTABLISHED UNDER THE DRAFT TREATY AND THE PROTOCOL
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